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Belief and normativity
16 references·5 citing·33 second hop
Belief and normativity (2007)Belief and normativityThe Nature of Normativity (2007)The Nature of NormativityDoes thought imply ought? (2007)Does thought imply ought?A Virtue Epistemology (2007)A Virtue EpistemologyNo Norm Needed: on the Aim of Belief (2006)No Norm Needed: on the Aim of…Why Be Rational? (2005)Why Be Rational?Doxastic Deliberation (2005)Doxastic DeliberationThe Normativity of Content (2003)The Normativity of ContentDoes Belief Have an Aim? (2003)Does Belief Have an Aim?The Aim Of Belief (2002)The Aim Of BeliefAuthority and Estrangement (2002)Authority and EstrangementThe Possibility of Practical Reason (2000)The Possibility of Practical …Normative Requirements (1999)Normative RequirementsMaking it Explicit. (1996)Making it Explicit.Plural and Conflicting Values (1992)Plural and Conflicting ValuesA Study of Concepts (1992)A Study of ConceptsThe varieties of reference (1982)The varieties of referenceOn Believing (2022)On BelievingThe Defeasibility of Knowledge‐How (2017)The Defeasibility of Knowledg…Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function? (2017)Explaining doxastic transpare…Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection (2015)Epistemic Instrumentalism and…IS EPISTEMIC AGENCY POSSIBLE? (2013)IS EPISTEMIC AGENCY POSSIBLE?A theory of justice original editionAn Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (2001)Reflection and Disagreement (2007)How We Get Along (2009)Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence (2010)The Moral Problem (1994)The Sources of Normativity (1996)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Against Content Normativity (2009)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)How Truth Governs Belief (2003)A New Argument for Evidentialism (2006)Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action (2006)Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (2020)Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism (2005)Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice (2005)Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger (2013)Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (2012)On the people's terms: a republican theory and model of democracy (2013)The Transparency of Experience (2002)Doing without Concepts (2009)Origins of Objectivity (2010)Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience (2007)The Phenomenological Mind (2007)Motivation and Agency (2003)Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts (2009)Toward a political conception of corporate responsibility: Business and society seen from a habermasian perspective (2007)Learning from Words (2008)Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? (2009)What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? (2004)The Philosophy of Sociality (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1982The varieties of reference2,360 cited
  • 1992A Study of Concepts1,631 cited
  • 2000The Possibility of Practical Reason1,248 cited
  • 1996Making it Explicit.1,147 cited
  • 2002Authority and Estrangement894 cited
  • 1999Normative Requirements803 cited
  • 2005Why Be Rational?708 cited
  • 2007The Nature of Normativity701 cited
  • 2005Doxastic Deliberation685 cited
  • 2007A Virtue Epistemology631 cited
  • 1992Plural and Conflicting Values289 cited
  • 2002The Aim Of Belief279 cited
  • 2003The Normativity of Content250 cited
  • 2006No Norm Needed: on the Aim of Belief244 cited
  • 2003Does Belief Have an Aim?146 cited
  • 2007Does thought imply ought?123 cited

Cited by

  • 2017The Defeasibility of Knowledge‐How54 cited
  • 2017Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?

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46 cited
  • 2015Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection45 cited
  • 2022On Believing33 cited
  • 2013IS EPISTEMIC AGENCY POSSIBLE?24 cited