Rethinking the Role of Judicial Independence in Socialist-Transforming East Asia

Abstract

Abstract This article argues that judicial independence is a poor indicator of the capacity of courts effectively to resolve commercial disputes. Judicial power is a more accurate measure because it assesses whether courts have sufficient jurisdiction, discretionary authority and enforcement powers to make decisions over socially meaningful commercial problems. In fact, judicial independence may reduce the power of newly emerging commercial courts in socialist-transforming Asia, which need politics to protect them from interference by powerful governments and private investors. This article explores the trade-offs between judicial power and political patronage by inquiring into the circumstances where patronage may slide into interference. It also investigates the conditions in which judges are most likely to acquire or arrogate discretionary powers to understand politics on their terms. Finally, this article analyses the highly polarized views in this region about what constitutes valid judicial determinations. The message for international agencies contemplating judicial reforms is that reducing political influence and promoting law-based decisions will not uniformly generate popular support and legitimacy for courts.

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