Partisan Politics

Abstract

Only a few studies of the lower federal court confirmation process consider the role of the race/gender of nominees in that process and none consider the intersection of party politics with those characteristics. We address this deficiency, arguing that the different electoral incentive structures of the two major parties have consequences for the treatment of minority and female nominees. The levels of minority and female support enjoyed by the Democratic Party, as well as the Republican Party’s desire to shed its reputation as being insensitive to issues of importance to those constituencies, lead us to expect that the nominations of minorities and women will be handled most expeditiously under conditions of unified Republican control, followed by unified Democratic control, divided control with a Republican president and divided control with a Democratic president. Our empirical analysis provides partial support for this hierarchy and demonstrates the importance of considering the conditioning effect of partisan politics.

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