Objectives. This study seeks to explain the variation in voter support for growth management policy. Interest group theory of local politics and property rights is used as a theoretical framework to explore how competing pro‐growth and anti‐growth interests influence the level of electoral support at the ballot box. Methods. Survey data collected from local planning officials in Massachusetts are analyzed using a two‐stage Heckman selection model. Results. The results indicate that development competition has a negative effect and controversy over development a positive effect on the probability of a community placing growth management policy on the local ballot. The analysis further indicates that environmental interests and suburban communities have a positive influence on the percentage of votes cast in favor of conservation‐oriented growth management policy. Neighborhood‐based interests, on the other hand, have a negative influence on voter support. Conclusions. The findings suggest that compared to the normal legislative process, ballot‐box voting allows anti‐growth and localized interests the opportunity to craft proposals and then mobilize support for policy changes.
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