New Players in an Old Game

Abstract

This article compares two spatial models of party competition: (a) the traditional proximity model and (b) the directional model of voter choice. The article first lays out the differences between the two models in multiparty systems. The traditional proximity model makes no clear prediction about the spatial structure of political parties; the directional model predicts that optimal placement for parties will be along the circumference of a circle at a moderate distance from the center. Both theories have implications for overtime strategy and the success of new political parties. Traditional proximity theory emphasizes movement toward a location with high density of voters, while directional theory emphasizes the importance of a distinct directional strategy. The authors examine the Norwegian political system from 1969-1985 and the Swedish system from 1979-1982 and find the directional theory more strongly supported.

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