Re-Reading Sociology via the Emotions: Karl Marx's Theory of Human Nature and Estrangement

Abstract

Marx's conception of human nature includes human “passions” and “emotions” as fundamental, integrative aspects of our social nature and our human capacity for “free conscious activity.” However, “emotion” has been largely excluded from the sociological lexicon and the capacity for conscious action has often been viewed at the level of the individual actor and, moreover, in overly “cognitive” and “rational” terms. As a result, the very reading of classic texts has been historically biased against the seeing of emotion, even when it is addressed. What difference does the inclusion of emotion in Marx's conception of human nature make for our understanding of both his theory of estrangement and related work today?

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