Environmental Concern and Cooperative-Competitive Behavior in a Simulated Commons Dilemma

Abstract

Commons-dilemma simulation games are designed to examine behavior associated with preservation and destruction of slowly regenerating natural resources. In Experiment 1, 120 introductory psychology students in the United States were assigned to high- or low-environmental-concern conditions based on a median split of their scores from a pretest. They then played either a points game, in which they selected numerical points from a slowly regenerating pool, or a tree game, in which they harvested trees from a jointly managed forest. After the game, subjects were asked to sign a petition for an environmental cause, to participate in a litter pick-up, and to participate in a recycling drive. Neither environmental concern nor proenvironmental behaviors were related to commons dilemma performance. In Experiment 2, 57 other introductory psychology students were assessed on environmental concern and Machiavellian personality, size of other players' harvesting choices, and other players' altruistic choices, all correlated with subjects' outcomes in the game. Overall, cooperation and competition were more important than environmental concern in predicting behavior in the commons dilemma simulation game.

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