An Institutional Analysis of Turnover in the Lower Federal Courts, 1900- 1987

Abstract

Retirement and resignation rates for lower federal court judges have been increasing steadily over the last two decades, yet there has been little systematic analysis either of the extent of, or reasons for this trend. Using multivariate time-series analysis, we investigate the turnover rates for lower federal court judges in the years 1900-1987, 1900-1953, and 1954-1987 by level of court and by political party. Drawing upon the literature on judicial and congressional retirements, we examine the impact of five variables on judicial leaving rates: presidential elections, salary increases, improved retirement benefits, caseload, and major Supreme Court decisions. We find that the caseload in each court, marked shifts in Supreme Court policies and especially presidential elections are consistently associated with judicial turnover in both lower federal courts for Democratic and Republican judges alike. Moreover, the electoral and major case effects continue to be statistically significant in the post-1953 era of rising turnover rates and spiraling caseloads. In general, then, judicial retirement/resignation rates have been strongly influenced by political/ideological considerations, and infused with partisanship, especially after 1954.

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