Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

Abstract

On 25th July 1894, the Japanese navy sank the Chinese man-of-war Gaosheng without warning and thus officially started the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The war was a culmination of the rivalries between the two countries for two decades. Japan, strengthened by its Meiji reforms, and still growing in power, wanted to extend its power within the Korean peninsula. China, on the other hand, was desperately clinging to its influence over its largest, oldest and last vassal. The was was watched with great interest by the European powers as a litmus test of the relative success of the modernization programs carried out by the two countries in the years before. Many observers expected a real fight to be at hand. But this was not to be. The Chinese army was thoroughly beaten in one battle after another: in Pingrang (September 1894), Lushun (November 1894), and Weihaiwei (February 1895). Meanwhile, the Chinese Beiyang Fleet was also heavily beaten by the Japanese navy in the Battle of the Yellow Sea (September 1894). By March 1895, Beijing had come under the Japanese threat. In April, the Chinese government was forced to sue for peace under humiliating terms.

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