The subjective, experiential element in perception.

Abstract

The problem of sentience and how we are to understand it is addressed. It is argued inter alia that sentience can find its place in psychological theory only in relation to perception and other modes of awareness. Basic issues examined, therefore, pertain to the subjective, experiential element in perception, to the qualitative contents of perceptual and imaginai awarenesses. These issues are basic to the theory of the percept (and image) and have to do with where and how to locate the experiential element in a materialist world view. Subjective knowledge of qualitative contents is no less structural than knowledge by description; any advantage that exists is in respect to a mode of knowing rather than in what can be known about them. The subject ‘participates’ in what he comes to know, but such participation does not make for knowledge unique to him. Nor does what he knows by this route count against qualitative contents belonging to brain processes, except perhaps for the problematic property of ‘grain’. The discussion proceeds via review and evaluation of a variety of relevant views and arguments.

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