This article analyses how the European Union's response to the euro‐crisis has altered the constitutional balance upon which its stability is based. It argues that the stability and legitimacy of any political system requires the structural incorporation of individual and political self‐determination. In the context of theEU, this requirement is met through the idea of constitutional balance, with ‘substantive’, ‘institutional’ and ‘spatial’ dimensions. Analysing reforms toEUlaw and institutional structure in the wake of the crisis – such as the establishment of theESM, the growing influence of the European Council and the creation of a stand‐alone Fiscal Compact – it is argued that recent reforms are likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of theEUto mediate conflicting interests in all three areas. By undermining its constitutional balance, the response to the crisis is likely to dampen the long‐term stability and legitimacy of theEUproject.
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