Group Beneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured PopulationRobert T. Boyd, Peter J. Richerson2002-04-01articleJournal of Theoretical Biology455 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolution and Genetic DynamicsLanguage and cultural evolutionAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 455 citations exist upstream.References1983An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.1983An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change1986Culture and the Evolutionary Process2001Culture and systems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition.2001The evolution of prestige: freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information1993Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games1992Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groupsCited by2002Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection2008The Coevolution of Cultural Groups and Ingroup Favoritism2006Game theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games2003The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions2015Perceiving mental states2014The emergence of human prosociality: aligning with others through feelings, concerns, and norms2007Late Pleistocene climate change and Paleolithic cultural evolution in northern China: Implications from the Last Glacial Maximum2010Cooperation and Status in Organizations