THE SUPERVENIENCE ARGUMENT AGAINST MORAL REALISM

James Dreier

102 citations0/0 files storedThe Southern Journal of Philosophy

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

In 1971, Simon Blackburn worked out an argument against moral realism appealing to the supervenience of the moral realm on the natural realm. 1 He has since revised the argument, in part to take account of objections, 2 but the basic structure remains intact. While commentators 3 seem to agree that the argument is not successful, they have not agreed upon what goes wrong. I believe this

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References

1979The Problem of the Essential Indexical 1979Attitudes De Dicto and De Se 1963The Language of Morals 1977Frege on Demonstratives 1986Moral Realism 1984Concepts of Supervenience 1965Assertion 1993Reality, Representation, and Projection

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20059 Necessity and Non‐Existence 2013What is at Stake in Debates among Normative Realists?20054 Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants 1993ARISTOTLE AND SUPERVENIENCE 2018Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?2015Explaining the Quasi-Real 2011Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare1 2018Moral supervenience

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