Universal Human Rights and the Problem of Unbounded Cultural Meanings

Abstract

Freedom from violence stands as an important candidate for a universal human right. By definition, however, such rights apply only to phenomena that are universally perceived and experienced and take predictable expression, a possibility that many contemporary interpretations of cultural theory reject. Yet people who live dramatically different lives—on tourist islands in the West Indies or as hunter‐gatherers and reindeer herders in Arctic regions—agree about components that comprise a unitary phenomenon legitimately called "violence." This is consistent with findings from cognitive and neruological science and with a more Geertzian theory that culture understood as meaning is not a thing, cultural variability occurs between individuals, and cultural consensus emerges as a necessary consequence of social interaction among people who participate in common social fields, who engage in common social discourse.

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