Improving fiscal policy in the EU: the case for independent forecasts

2006-07-01articleEconomic Policy236 citationsclosed

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Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Monetary Policy and Economic Impact German Economic Analysis & Policies

Abstract

ARE OFFICIAL OUTPUT FORECASTS BIASED? We point out that official forecasts of output dynamics are crucial to the assessment of cyclically adjusted budget balances, and provide evidence that in some euro-area countries biased forecasts have played a thus far neglected role in generating excessive deficits. We suggest that the forecast bias may be politically motivated, and that forecasts produced by an independent authority would be better than in-house Ministry of Finance forecasts for the purpose of monitoring budget formation and budget outcomes. — Lars Jonung and Martin Larch

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