When Are We Self-Deceived?*

Alfred R. Mele

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

This article‘s point of departure is a proto-analysis that I have suggested of entering self-deception in acquiring a belief and an associated set of jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception that I have proposed. Partly with the aim of fleshing out an important member of the proposed set of conditions, I provide a sketch of my view about how selfdeception happens. I then return to the proposed set of jointly sufficient conditions and offer a pair of amendments.

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References

1973Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability 1990The case for motivated reasoning.2008Social psychology: handbook of basic principles 1983Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.1982Book Review Nisbett, R. , & Ross, L.Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment.Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980.2006Thinking and Deciding 2000Self-Deception Unmasked 1975Point of view and perceptions of causality.

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2018Political Self-Deception

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