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Abstract It is usually taken for granted that we could experience the passage of time. Since it seems to us that we experience the passage of time it is therefore assumed that we have prima facie reason to believe that time passes. But this is false; the passage of time could not be an object of experience because it could not cause, shape or influence temporal experience in any way. After explaining each premise of the argument I discuss several objections that are likely to be raised. I also discuss some related epistemic arguments against the passage of time given by Huw Price and David Braddon‐Mitchell along with objections raised against them by Tim Maudlin and Peter Forrest respectively.
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Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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