Government Supply and Government Production Failure: A Framework Based on Contestability

Aidan R. Vining · David Leo Weimer

99 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Public Policy

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Public Policy and Administration Research Economic Theory and Institutions Legal and Constitutional Studies

Abstract

ABSTRACT A complete conceptual framework for policy analysis requires a theory of government supply and government production failure to complement the well-developed theory of market failure provided by welfare economics. Charles Wolf has made an important start by attempting to draw parallels between market failures and the manifestations of government supply failures. This article provides a more useful analytical framework for government supply failure in two important ways. First, it draws on several perspectives from the economics of organization to sketch both normative and positive theories of government supply. Second, it uses the positive theory of government supply behavior to make direct comparisons with the traditional market failures. It concludes with some implications of the framework for assessing the potential gains from privatization.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 99 citations exist upstream.

References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1987The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 1986The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization 1978Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process 1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government 1983Agency Problems and Residual Claims 1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation

Cited by

1992Ownership versus competition: Efficiency in public enterprise 2012The lessons of failure: learning and blame avoidance in public policy-making 2014Why are policy innovations rare and so often negative? Blame avoidance and problem denial in climate change policy-making 2000Regulation Inside Government: Public Interest Justifications and Regulatory Failures 2000"Make or buy" decisions in the production of health care goods and services: new insights from institutional economics and organizational theory.

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.