Sculpture and Touch: Herder's Aesthetics of Sculpture

Abstract

Among the art forms identified in the eighteenth century as central—painting, music, sculpture, architecture, and literature—sculpture has perhaps received the least focused attention from aestheticians and art historians.1 Sculpture often has been treated, then and now, as one of the visual (or plastic) arts, together with painting, which latter has been the dominant focus of discussion. Even eighteenth‐ and nineteenth‐century German aestheticians, who, in the wake of Winckelmann, take Greek classical sculpture as the paradigmatic art, discuss the specific artistic qualities of sculpture or the specific aesthetic experience it affords remarkably little, often treating it under the more general category of plastic art. In this article, I propose to discuss a little‐known treatment of sculpture from that German tradition, which attempts precisely to argue that sculpture has its own norms and provides its own type of aesthetic experience, by contrast to painting: that of Johann Gottfried Herder in his work Sculpture: Some Observations on Shape and Form from Pygmalion's Creative Dream (first draft written in 1768‐‐1770, and then revised, expanded, and published in 1778).2 Herder argues that sculpture is a distinctive art form because it is directed toward and appreciated by the sense of touch, rather than vision. I shall suggest that Herder's attempt to define sculpture as an art form by reference to the sense of touch is not successful, but that his arguments are useful for making salient distinctive aspects of experience of (some) sculpture and making connections between aesthetic theory and art critical discourse. More importantly, in attempting to articulate an aesthetics of touch, Herder is strikingly innovative in the context of aesthetic theory of his time (and, to a large degree, ours), for touch has been considered to be a sense incapable of affording aesthetic experience. Touch has, moreover, been so considered because (it is believed) it is too connected to the body and thus (purportedly) too little connected to “higher” cognitive functions to afford aesthetic experience. Conversely, as I shall argue, Herder's account of sculpture—as an art addressed to touch, an art preeminently of and for human beings as embodied creatures—is a fruitful, provocative starting point for the articulation of an embodied aesthetics. I shall begin by outlining Herder's proposed systematic aesthetic theory, of which his essay on sculpture was to be the first part, before turning to his arguments concerning sculpture. I shall then make some remarks concerning their interest and implications. Herder engages in detailed criticism of other eighteenth‐century aesthetic theories, but in general terms he shares their project: to understand the beautiful (and the sublime and other aesthetic qualities), which undertaking is, in turn, understood as an investigation into properties of objects that are pleasurable to human beings, and the “underlying causes” of this phenomenon, that is, why and how they are thus pleasurable.3 Like the majority of his contemporaries, too, Herder holds that aesthetics concerns sensible representation or experience of objects: it is the sensible qualities of objects that are aesthetically pleasing, and aesthetic appreciation engages our sensible faculties or powers—the senses as well as imagination.4 In particular, Herder endorses (with some caveats) Baumgarten's definition of the beautiful as “sensuous perfection.”5 Sensuous perfection—the unity of multiplicity in the object and in our appreciative experience of it—explains our pleasure in the object: it is such a unity of multiplicity and thus ontologically and epistemically valuable, and we, in experiencing this object, correspondingly best exert our sensible powers, engaging and uniting them in a rich, active way.6 Herder argues, however, that this definition is rather abstract, insufficiently descriptive of aesthetic experience, that is, of which objects of which kinds are connected to which feelings. To gain a sufficient theory of aesthetic experience, indeed to understand the meaning of ‘beauty’ so defined, Herder claims, we must trace this definition back to the sense experience upon which it is grounded and which it purports to describe. Like the classical empiricists, then, Herder believes that all concepts are both formed from sense experience and ultimately meaningful by reference to the concrete character of such experience. This reference to sense experience is particularly necessary in a theoretical aesthetics, which after all aims to account for valuable sense experience.7 Herder's innovation is to propose that such meaningfulness can be obtained only if one attends to the character of the different senses and their corresponding objects: though beauty (and the experience of it) is in every case a unified appreciation of the unity of multiplicity in an object, the beauties for sight, for hearing, and for touch are substantively different from one another. For each sense receives information about different properties of objects, generates different concepts of those properties, and is unified, ordered, in its own operation in a different manner; each provides a different, specified concept of beauty.8 This sense‐differentiated account of aesthetic experience will also, Herder claims, provide a differentiated account of the arts, that is, as objects aimed to be beautiful for their respective senses: painting, music, and sculpture. (‘Fine art’ may be generally defined as an object designed to be beautiful, but as in the case of ‘beauty,’ this definition is too general to provide a substantive ontology of the different arts.)9 As a basis for a systematic account of the arts, Herder's approach seems problematic: as for Hegel, who later similarly attempts to use different means of sensible representation (or media) systematically to differentiate the arts, both literature and architecture cause difficulties for Herder, as neither appears to be directed toward a single sense. (And this is only to mention two other very central, recognized arts in the eighteenth‐century “system of the arts.”) I shall not, however, be concerned with these issues, but shall now turn to the innovative aesthetics of sculpture Herder proposes as part of this systematic approach. Herder argues that sculpture is addressed to the sense of touch primarily on the ground that touch provides us with distinctive concepts, that is, those that concern three‐dimensional bodies as such: mass, weight, solidity, three‐dimensional space (depth and volume), and three‐dimensional form. (One might add here concepts concerning and or Herder not In of this Herder the a who then his sight, a or as to by touch or he must to the three‐dimensional with its visual Like and Herder believes that the to is the Like too, Herder upon the of concerning a who, after a to to his visual experience with his of to and understand or and to visual experience more which as a an of one more concerning the distinctive of to the (and, least the or and so they suggest as Herder claims, concerning the cognitive of the and concepts of three‐dimensional mass, and solidity, their touch visual experience not bodies to them in the Herder from as the to for and objects in to understand their and or to understand more Herder that we not or three‐dimensional weight, or sight, but rather because are three‐dimensional Herder they are directed and appreciated the sense of As it this is or least some I not of these properties might well be as well as As Herder moreover, the and concepts from touch and into one sense we may to to but as we visual experience to be of three‐dimensional objects, with and solidity, as Herder we not in by but rather by of Herder's however, that we are often very to touch are by to touch are often by Herder more his that we sculpture by in aesthetic experience of sculpture, we touch, the sense of as by touch or as a for then we must is by touch in these is such different from visual experience in why must touch be this is visual Herder's to these are not suggest that in such visual experience we must concepts from the sense of touch, but this is to a specific for touch in aesthetic experience of sculpture. Herder's in all visual experience, we such concepts as and so and he too that the experience of objects that are us to such concepts as Herder's I however, not cognitive but concerning our to and unified, pleasurable sensible beauty of a Herder not a visual but Herder to provide us with of properties of bodies that we more of and understand for to three‐dimensional or of to and experience of these properties however, from might here of the between the of and it on a In both we understand the object to weight, but in the this is and might not a sensible experience of the For and cognitive these two of may be or the one may in this provide us with more for aesthetic and pleasurable sense may not Herder the terms that beauty of from in aesthetic qualities not only upon qualities of objects but such qualities as pleasurable and so for In experiencing sculpture, then, we not least in the weight, for of the we might use our visual experience in to the experience of weight, in in turn to it as and so Herder argues that by we a unified experience of a his of is to aesthetic experience and can approach a from it but it has only one point of from which to one part of the as a and so it must that point of as often as it to on a different part of the a different is directed a single point of for sculpture, however, are as of as are in the that I can the and from each of which I can single point I the work in its I must it in to each point only a and I the I more than a of and these must first be by the before we can of the as a this is it then a of of the which it shall only as a a visual a of In this art, the of the is on the is sculpture for the not because the a body as a not because the from sculpture, the very of its art and its with This and Herder as its beautiful form and beautiful beautiful that its is or but the body with beauty and it is but the and of that that of or of and This can more be into a than it can be into a or an for then it that is to a of different the that we to sculpture by Herder's that sculpture is, of human form is here in his the of the sculpture. I will to these In the however, I to attention to the in both we not experience of the sculpture as a as unified, but only experience a of from different which and add to a representation of the work as a Herder that the the in with a of the sculpture is not or in a In to a of the the of the of the sculpture, we must our that it the we must the of the different visual or must touch experience of a it from all or in one Herder's here in part on a with that our own and to touch (and as I shall suggest is, on Herder's one form of information as and of our own is to touch, not vision. provides of a visual from one and thus the three‐dimensional of the sculpture be as a by of these More however, Herder's here is rather to that proposed by concerning the between visual experience and and the experience of objects from and for a point of sculpture not or a In Herder's (and not as we the sculpture in to gain a of the sculpture, from all such visual experience aims is a of bodies as they are for Herder's point is, however, though we can a visual of a three‐dimensional object by as we the object as on Herder's or the and of this is, he to touch, not visual experience is by and directed toward the of experience by touch, and also, importantly, a or of by Herder provides two arguments for the of touch in experience of sculpture, which are on artistic Herder that touch is in because it the experience. of experience from to is one of art, on Herder's is, make by the sense of touch, the of the object, these touch with the Herder not this in of making is Herder a must to and form in all its the as it his of its as if he it in the of his a form from all he he one the other is he with its of its mass, its he its as the space that the in As the touch, the might in a of be rather than the object in his is and in the case of sculpture, his are not, in by the own touch, but rather as a of a if we are to the experience of the as and in the sculpture, we too must the sense of Herder that we the unity and the meaning of sculpture with human of the sense of touch, in the form of that is, our of the and of our own bodies is by in the as we not to as a form of it is, too, a sense of a body with in three‐dimensional in with other sense of touch, one might of and from the this form of touch on Herder's our experience of a human a it of us and our very the of human the to our into the and of the and the the the body the this and into we so to embodied in the before or the in is by our own must be and as if it a it must be by the of our sense and by our of In that we into the of the I Herder means that we use to experience the sculpture, as a here a human and in turn are in our of our own Herder to understand the of the sculpture, the in which the of the sculpture can or to that is, the in which this body is Herder beauty of the human body is the of and in every of this is that can be and by all who are to in or in the form of the of in the human not, that is, visual or or a with of but rather our into the and of the body and thus the or of a body with such a This too a sense of the sculpture as a time not of the form its but of the the of human bodies in these and visual experience be to such of Herder this to ground rather and aesthetic concerning norms of making and Sculpture is, as in beautiful form by human beings to be so and to experience Sculpture is, defined as three‐dimensional form (with mass, solidity, volume), and in with an form by and this Herder one can concerning it not be the to its is to and from the it is, its sculpture of human human it detailed representation of of and other that might the and sense of touch in its of unified it be of single not of the of sculpture is to be and to one single one to sculpture touch, to its as or but not to its context its single and so and of Herder's For his definition not to sculpture (or or of sculpture not, sculpture from and which are three‐dimensional objects (and so might in that for sculpture, and not for painting, these qualities are rather than they are not for the artistic as a but the specific character of which our and experience of the might in Herder's that he a between and and a single and appreciation of are too, to properties of and architecture may be understood as single to be appreciated from (or though Herder has identified some that may be to sculpture, he has not a for sculpture. the Herder to from this distinctive to or indeed to be in Herder's that or is to appreciation seems particularly Herder's to and the of Greek sculpture, which has Herder's time been to be be about the cause Herder some on this of to be on if to the sense of touch, is why they not in to the sense of as by by engaging of on Herder's moreover, that our appreciation of sculpture is touch (or that the for a cognitive of the to that it a human for our In other I not as Herder appears to that a appreciation of sculpture touch is an (or experience to appreciation of sculpture by the on the other is it that not art form on Herder's not to the sense of touch to the use of concepts from might for the of the in or of these claims, as well as Herder's that is to be only in of the human moreover, into by later sculpture, the of the forms of or the of and for such as the and forms about Herder's least in its its on its of with beauty the only aesthetic or artistic and into I however, only a rather by of the of his a Herder of or appreciation of (some) sculpture well as from other aesthetics of which is, innovative in of the aesthetics of his the eighteenth‐century it is more than that only and not provide aesthetic experience. however, that this is grounded upon the that these two senses us to objects as from as and as thus only or objects can afford from the representation of or properties of the of artistic or from those of by is as with little to or to its operation and to the of and As Herder his of sculpture is to that may not be that a sense after it is the of all of other and has a of concepts to Herder a of different qualities to touch, as we and not a of different of touch Herder's to be least of are our to the of of qualities such as and our of as single objects, three‐dimensional and our of of in as by other This on Herder's is as our to trace the of a sculpture we and as the of our of it may with in our of a sculpture as a as in Herder not such as the his account that touch experience might be a of touch and be of an object as as different in and as a of or properties, such as and an seems that we be of an object, as all such properties and touch, and thus for those properties to (or to the sense of add to this to a of which we are and and such as or the object of thus of in general as it is a of the of the body in to one in In the case of a aesthetic pleasure is to not primarily from the and of the but from its as from in the case of classical and (or indeed of a the and qualities of and form must to aesthetic perhaps too to an appreciation of the in I here in more general terms that Herder, the classical empiricists, not of sense experience, aesthetic experience, as of or of his sense experience is by and by he for the of by for touch, of and and for hearing, I suggest too that these of touch or representation I both are to be by visual In the case of representation of human is Herder's but in terms from a of an between the of the sculpture as formed (or or it is of recognized to be but be recognized to be on and and so the sense of the sculpture as as the sculpture as one can into the its or its or its and active by too, not or as by is, such touch, one is of the in and of the in Herder's sculpture in a be understood as as an embodied or a body a Herder and to to as though here he not from art critical of sculpture, from the of as a for beauty in the German aesthetic In the tradition, such are embodied in the to which Herder in the to Sculpture and which might be to be his This the between the sculpture as representation and it as the in with the sculpture, it to be as a the sculpture such such he that it is in not not a is a the sculpture as art object has is concerning the of in our pleasure in sculpture of human to which I will In the case of sculpture (or sculpture these or will not as the one such might be understood as of of the and that be to the of a in the is, we might understand later not precisely as to Herder's claims, but as to different indeed the (and or aesthetically to that he (And some such as might be understood to be more from sculpture, perhaps as a art such as three‐dimensional of the other such may a similarly experience for touch, an experience of and and As the one may the of a sculpture and its its if it is not a human form. then, these touch to or not, the to be from experience of the or attempts to and are or in an but they might be to the of Herder's of the in the might provide an experience pleasurable to and of touch a more of the or of the and are not so the of his Herder that touch (or can afford from the representation of in an object, the artistic and some As I I not that Herder's provides a definition of sculpture or an account of and appreciation as from those of all other art it make salient and the for the mass, and so to least some sculpture and appreciation (and perhaps not as to of other which are in art critical concerning sculpture. contrast to the are general concepts proposed in the proposed by Herder's contemporaries, which not such or art critical Herder's account specific or critical to the experience of sculpture in particular, for concerning the the different of

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