On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation

Abstract

The theoretical controversies that the notion of social justice provokes today go far beyond the traditional framework of debates about the respective roles of the market and the state in the distribution of wealth.' The principal arguments that have been proposed seek, in effect, to define social rules capable of bringing about the unanimous agreement of individuals. The most radical form of liberalism maintains that protection against arbitrary coercion is the sole common aim of all human beings living in society. The liberty of individuals is identified with their security: protected from coercion by others, every individual may freely seek happiness as he understands it, determine his own goals, and attempt to realize them, at least as long as this exercise of his freedom does not encroach upon the freedom of his fellows. Security is thus the only acceptable political principle; while all individuals have different concrete goals, they all wish to pursue their own goals in peace. If the rules promulgated by the political authorities limit themselves to guaranteeing liberty as defined in this manner, they can be universal, and apply to all in an identical fashion, because liberty is the sole aspect under which all individuals are strictly identical. Indeed, whenever