An Absolutist Theory of Faultless Disagreement in Aesthetics

Carl Baker · Jon Robson

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

Abstract Some philosophers writing on the possibility of faultless disagreement have argued that the only way to account for the intuition that there could be disagreements which are faultless in every sense is to accept a relativistic semantics. In this article we demonstrate that this view is mistaken by constructing an absolutist semantics for a particular domain – aesthetic discourse – which allows for the possibility of genuinely faultless disagreements. We argue that this position (Humean absolutism) is an improvement over previous absolutist responses to the relativist's challenge and that it presents an independently plausible account of the semantics of aesthetic discourse.

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2005Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste*2014Assessment Sensitivity 2009Relativism and Monadic Truth 2007Relativism and disagreement 2007Nonindexical contextualism 2007Context, content, and relativism 2001On being in a quandary. Relativism vagueness logical revisionism 2010Disagreements about taste

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