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Implementing Quotas in University Admissions: An Experimental Analysis
16 references·2 citing·31 second hop
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References

  • 2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments9,517 cited
  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage2,082 cited
  • 2003School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach1,572 cited
  • 1974On cores and indivisibility1,254 cited
  • 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • 2005Matching with Contracts802 cited
  • 1981Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm655 cited
  • 2005The New York City High School Match655 cited
  • 1973On Cores and Indivisibility584 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited
  • 2005School choice: an experimental study379 cited
  • 2009Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets362 cited
  • 2013School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation313 cited
  • 2005Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism

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306 cited

Cited by

  • 2016Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas75 cited
  • 2020The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures69 cited