Elections, information aggregation, and strategic voting

Timothy J. Feddersen · Wolfgang Pesendorfer

76 citations0/0 files storedProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Electoral Systems and Political Participation Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

A central role of elections is the aggregation of information dispersed within a population. This article surveys recent work on elections as mechanisms for aggregating information and on the incentives for voters to vote strategically in such elections.

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References

1992Game theory: analysis of conflict 1996Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem 1988Condorcet's Theory of Voting 1998Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting 1995The Swing Voter's Curse 1997Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information 1971The American Jury 1988Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective

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2008Epistemics for Forensics

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