Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs

Piero Gleijeses

84 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Latin American Studies

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History and International Relations Intelligence, Security, War Strategy Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics

Abstract

Abstract A comprehensive study of the available documents about the Bay of Pigs, including many that have been declassified within the last eighteen months, and extensive interviews with the protagonists in the CIA, the White House and the State Department lead me to conclude that the disastrous operation was launched not simply because Kennedy was poorly served by his young staff and was the captive of his campaign rhetoric, nor simply because of the hubris of the CIA. Rather, the Bay of Pigs was approved because the CIA and the White House assumed they were speaking the same language when, in fact, they were speaking in utterly different tongues.

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References

1982Groupthink : psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes 1966A Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy in the White House 1983Oral History 1983Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala 1992Shattered hope: the Guatemalan revolution and the United States, 1944–1954 1983The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention 1979Robert Kennedy and His Times 2017The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993

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