Carnap's Tolerance, Language Change and Logical Pluralism

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper, I distinguish different kinds of pluralism about logical consequence. In particular, I distinguish the pluralism about logic arising from Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance from a pluralism which maintains that there are different, equally “good ” logical consequence relations on the one language. I will argue that this second form of pluralism does more justice to the contemporary state of logical theory and practice than does Carnap’s more moderate pluralism. 1 Pluralism about Logical Consequence With JC Beall, I have argued for and defended a very particular account of logical pluralism [5, 6]. We take it that the notion of logical consequence is irreducibly plural in its application. That is, we take it that there are at least two distinct relations of logical consequence — and not simply two distinct relations in intension, but two distinct relations in extension. We take it that there are arguments which are valid according to one logic, and invalid according to another, and that there is no further fact of the matter as to whether the argument is really valid. For the sake of this paper let me be quite specific. I will take

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