A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION

Josef Hofbauer · Gerhard Sorger

47 citations0/0 files storedInternational Game Theory Review

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Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

The equilibrium selection model of Matsui and Matsuyama (1995), which is based on rational players who maximise their discounted future payoff, is analysed with the help of an associated differential game. Equilibrium selection results are derived for games with a ½-dominant equilibrium, for games with a potential function, and some simple supermodular games.

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References

1996Potential Games 1988A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games 1993Global Games and Equilibrium Selection 2010Global Games: Theory and Applications 1999Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions 2000Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution 1999Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions 1995An Approach to Equilibrium Selection

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2021A Comprehensive Survey on STP Approach to Finite Games 2006Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria 2010An improved algorithm for detecting potential games

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