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On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
16 references·0 citing·22 second hop
On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (2011)On two kinds of manipulation for school c…Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009)Strategy-proofness versus Eff…Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2009)Incentives and Stability in L…The New York City High School Match (2005)The New York City High School…The Boston Public School Match (2005)The Boston Public School MatchSchool Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)School Choice: A Mechanism De…A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Stu…Two-Sided Matching (1990)Two-Sided MatchingThe college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (1985)The college admissions proble…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1981)Machiavelli and the Gale-Shap…Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods (1977)Weak versus strong domination…On cores and indivisibility (1974)On cores and indivisibilityOn Cores and Indivisibility (1973)On Cores and IndivisibilityCollege Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignThe Redesign of the Matching …Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2012)Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)61. Capitalism and Freedom (2002)Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010)The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)The assignment game I: The core (1971)A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem (2001)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2007)The Theory of Linear Economic Models (1962)House Allocation with Existing Tenants (1999)Core in a simple coalition formation game (2001)A limit theorem on the core of an economy (2008)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)Matching with Contracts (2005)The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002)The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks (2002)
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References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage2,082 cited
  • 2003School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach1,572 cited
  • 1990Two-Sided Matching1,377 cited
  • 1974On cores and indivisibility1,254 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 1981Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm655 cited
  • 2005The New York City High School Match655 cited
  • 1973On Cores and Indivisibility584 cited
  • 1999A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement567 cited
  • 2005The Boston Public School Match531 cited
  • 2009Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match500 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited
  • 1977Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods378 cited
  • 2009Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets

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