Is payment by results the most efficient way to address the challenges faced by the criminal justice sector?

Abstract

In recent years the UK government has emphasized evidence-based policy, as a part of which the Payment by Results (PbR) approach has increasingly been promoted. Payment by Results allows the government to pay a provider of services on the basis of specified outcomes achieved rather than the inputs or outputs delivered. Linked to PbR is the innovative source of funding social interventions know as Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). We discuss the potential benefits of PbR and survey its use across the UK public sector. Then, concentrating in particular on the Criminal Justice System (CJS) we outline three methodological challenges to the implementation of PbR: gaming, measuring outcomes and identifying fiscal benefits. We then identify a number of challenges to the implementation of PbR. We conclude that PbR has a place in commissioning services, but that its role in the CJS is likely to be limited and unlikely to succeed as a socially efficient means of attracting new sources of funding. We finish by considering two alternatives to PbR: justice reinvestment and personalization.

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