The innate and the acquired: Useful clusters or a residual distinction from folk biology?

Abstract

The idea of the innate and the acquired is a part of folk-biology but is also used by biologists, psychologists and cognitive scientists in their disciplines. Are they right to do so? Innateness is often defined by appealing to the role of genes in development, to the role of Darwinian evolution in shaping developmental processes, to the non-involvement of learning during development, to developmental robustness, and to modularity. We argue that all such definitions are unsatisfactory. Some are unsatisfactory because they are based on simplistic and empirically outmoded views of development. Others are empirically defensible but are unsatisfactory because they do not capture the full breadth of the use of the term "innate" and, due to this restriction, they can easily lead to inferential mistakes. The definition of acquired behavior has been used with greater sophistication and is generally regarded as being heterogeneous. Nevertheless, in as much as the overall category has been seen in opposition to the innate, it has been an obstacle to a thorough investigation of how behavior develops. We suggest that a useful way forward is to examine whether or not the empirically well-established properties often associated with the concept of innate and the concept of acquired form theoretically useful clusters. This path leads to a much fuller appreciation of the view favored by Gilbert Gottlieb, according to which development involves the continuous interplay of the organism (and its genes) with its environment.

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