Preprintgreen2015

Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Laboratory Evidence

38 citations0/0 files storedRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

We investigate how third-party punishers and potential violators decide under evidentiary uncertainty in a take game. In line with the legal requirement and in contrast to economic models, neither the sanction nor the harm level affects the punishment probability, but the quality of evidence does have an impact. Potential violators' decisions are strongly influenced by the expected punishment probability but not by the level of the sanction.

Citations in this library

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References

2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments 2002Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects 2004An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments 1991Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?2016R&D Partnerships and Innovation Performance: Can There Be too Much of a Good Thing?2017Direct and cross scheme effects in a research and development subsidy program 2012The Rise of the East and the Far East: German Labor Markets and Trade Integration 2006Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence

Cited by

2020Innovation, institutional ownership and financial constraints 2015The Impact of Private Equity on Firms' Innovation Activity

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