Aid

Abstract

Temporary membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has pernicious effects on the political and economic development of nations, particularly in nondemocracies. The leaders of rich democratic states often trade resources for the salient policy favors that UNSC members can deliver. This provides the leaders of temporary UNSC members with access to “easy money” resources. Such resources have deleterious consequences, particularly in nondemocracies, because they provide leaders with the means to pay off their coalition of supporters without reliance on tax revenues. While foreign aid is an important form of easy money bribe, it is but one of many. Empirical tests show loans are a substitute means for bribing UNSC members.

Cite this

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Michael Smith (2012). Aid. Journal of Conflict Resolution. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712464315

@article{de2012aid,
  title  = {Aid},
  author = {Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de and Smith, Alastair Michael},
  year   = {2012},
  journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  doi    = {10.1177/0022002712464315}
}

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