Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable InformationPhilippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Rey1994-03-01articleEconometrica572 citationsgreenNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Game Theory and ApplicationsGame Theory and Voting SystemsLaw, Economics, and Judicial SystemsAbstractFLWNOCitations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 572 citations exist upstream.References1979Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations1978Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process1982Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model1982Moral Hazard in Teams1983Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading1986The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling1988Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation1984Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining ApproachCited by2002Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium1999Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts2009Firm‐Specific Human Capital: A Skill‐Weights Approach1999Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting2003Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle1999Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts2005Incentives Between Firms (and Within)2005Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management