The history of conditional agenda–setting in european institutions

George Tsebelis · Amie Kreppel

152 citations0/0 files storedEuropean Journal of Political Research

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European Union Policy and Governance European and International Law Studies Political Systems and Governance

Abstract

Abstract The purpose of this article is twofold. Our first goal is to make explicit an institutionalist theory of European integration. This theory is based on the concept of ‘conditional agenda setting’, which we argue has played an important role in European integration. According to this theory, the fact that Commission proposals are more easily accepted than modified by the Council has accelerated the pace of integration. This finding brings us to the second goal of this article which is to investigate, by studying the history of EU institutions, whether or not these institutions were the result of conscious planning. We demonstrate that while some of the founding fathers (Hallstein, Spaak) and opponents of the EU (de Gaulle) had an accurate understanding of the institutional structures created in Rome, later participants in the integration process did not. In particular, the arguments surrounding the Single European Act indicate a lack of understanding of the full implications of the institutions selected.

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References

1993Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach 1995Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism 1988THE JOINT‐DECISION TRAP: LESSONS FROM GERMAN FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1991The Transformation of Europe 1991Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community 1994The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter 1994Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community 2005European Parliament 1999–2004

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1999Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?2000The European Union: Economics and Policies 2013An elephant on the 13th floor of the Berlaymont? European Council and Commission relations in legislative agenda setting 2004Procedural Politics 2008The powers of the Union: delegation in the EU

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