A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

Abstract

Using dimes and pennies on a checkerboard, Schelling (1971, 1978) Schelling, T. C. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior, New York, NY: Norton. [Google Scholar] studied the link between residential preferences and segregational neighborhood patterns. While his approach clearly has methodological advantages in studying the dynamics of residential segregation, Schelling's checkerboard model has never been rigorously analyzed. We propose an extension of the Schelling model that incorporates economic variables. Using techniques recently developed in stochastic evolutionary game theory, we mathematically characterize the model's long-term dynamics.

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