Self‐Insurance and Self‐Protection as Public Goods

Tim Lohse · Julio R. Robledo · Ulrich Schmidt

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Insurance and Financial Risk Management Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Economic Policies and Impacts

Abstract

Abstract Many public goods provide utility by insuring against hazardous events. Those public goods can have self‐insurance and self‐protection character. For both situations we analyze the efficient public provision level and the provision level resulting from Nash behavior in a private provision game. We consider the interaction of public goods as insurance devices with market insurance. The availability of market insurance reduces the provision level of the public good for both public and private provision, regardless of whether we consider self‐insurance or self‐protection. Moreover, we show that Nash behavior has always a larger impact than the availability of market insurance.

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References

1954The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure 1964Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large 1976Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large 1996The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods 1986On the private provision of public goods 1989Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large 1972Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection 1992Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection

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