What really matters: conservativeness or independence?

Jakob de Haan · Willem J. Kooi

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Global Financial Crisis and Policies

Abstract

Contemporary views often support the idea that a high level of central bank independence, together with a clear mandate for it to restrain inflation, are important institutional devices for maintaining price stability. The meaning and policy implications of central bank independence are discussed. Two indicators of central bank independence are tested, and it is shown that 'instrument independence' (the freedom of a central bank to choose its policy means) is important for inflation performance, but other aspects of central bank independence and 'conservativeness' have little or no impact on inflation. JEL Codes: E58, G20

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References

1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target 1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes 1991Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries 1992Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence 1995The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence 1983Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy 1995Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Costs?

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2013Policy coordination, conflicting national interests and the European debt crisis 2011The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty 1999Central Bank Independence and the Lessons for Transition Economies from Developed and Developing Countries 2022Central Bank Independence and Inflation Preferences: New Empirical Evidence on the Effects on Inflation 2011Quest for the Best: How to Measure Central Bank Independence and Show its Relationship with Inflation

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