McDowell on Skepticism, Disjunctivism, and Transcendental Arguments

Paul Snowdon

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

McDowell’s disjunctive account of perceptual knowledge contains a novel addition to his interesting response to skepticism by placing within it a transcendental argument. It is not clear that such addition strengthens it. McDowell’s disjunctivism seems to involve both epistemological and experience- theoretical commitments. It is a two-sided structure, from which it could be raised questions about the assumed relation between the two sides. The purpose of this paper is to make some progress with evaluating McDowell’s contribution to the discussion on perceptual knowledge and illuminate more general aspects of the debate about disjunctivism.

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