Rational Thinking Promotes Suspect‐friendly Legal Decision Making

Eric Rassin

6 citations0/0 files storedApplied Cognitive Psychology

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Deception detection and forensic psychology Jury Decision Making Processes

Abstract

Summary Judges, juries, and other legal decision makers are frequently obligated to find facts about an alleged crime. Does this fact finding benefit from purely rational decision making or from a more intuitive approach? In three studies, rationality was found to be related to more suspect‐lenient decision making. The data suggest that fact finding in criminal proceedings is served best with strictly rational analyses of the evidence, rather than with intuition, gut feeling, and other obscure decision processes.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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2005Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making 1999The relation of rational and experiential information processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon.2006On Making the Right Choice: The Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect 1998Individual differences in rational thought.1990Intuition in the context of discovery 2012Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief 2005Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm 2007Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases

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