Wittgenstein and Objectivity in Ethics: A Reply to B randhorst

Abstract

Abstract In “Correspondence toReality inEthics”,MarioBrandhorst examines the view of ethics thatWittgenstein took in his later years. According toBrandhorst,Wittgenstein leaves room for truth and falsity, facts, correspondence and reality in ethics.Wittgenstein's target, arguesBrandhorst, is objectivity. I argue (i) thatBrandhorst's arguments in favour of truth, facts, reality and correspondence in ethics invite similar arguments in favour of objectivity, (ii) thatBrandhorst does not recognise this because his conception of objectivity is distorted by aPlatonist picture and (iii) that he misinterprets the passage which he takes to support aWittgensteinian case against objectivity.

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