Article2014

A Functional Account of Causation; or, A Defense of the Legitimacy of Causal Thinking by Reference to the Only Standard That Matters—Usefulness (as Opposed to Metaphysics or Agreement with Intuitive Judgment)

77 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of Science

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Philosophy and History of Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

This essay advocates a “functional” approach to causation and causal reasoning: these are to be understood in terms of the goals and purposes of causal thinking. This approach is distinguished from accounts based on metaphysical considerations or on reconstruction of “intuitions.”

Citations in this library

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References

1969Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-spectral Methods 2004Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation 1973Causation 1983What is a Law of Nature?1998Mind in a Physical World 2005The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics 2004Causation and Counterfactuals 1991Politics, Markets, and America's Schools

Cited by

2023The Human Affectome 2024The Worldly Infrastructure of Causation 2017A Deliberative Approach to Causation 2020Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective 2021Three Concepts of Actual Causation 2018Causal explanation and the periodic table 2025Metaphysics of Causation 2021What Caused the Bhopal Gas Tragedy? The Philosophical Importance of Causal and Pragmatic Details

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