Intersubjectivity: Exploring consciousness from the second-person perspective

Abstract

Today, the study of consciousness within Western science and philosophy is polarized between investigations of third-person, objective, correlates (e.g., neuroscience and cognitive science) and investigations of first-person, subjective experience and phenomena (e.g., introspection and ~edita­ tion). These two perspectives set the terms of debate in contemporary consciousness research: Is con­ sciousness first-person subjective or third-person objective? How can we bridge the explanatory gap between objective brains and subjective minds? Although many participants in this debate recognize that a comprehensive study of consciousness must include both first- and third-person perspectives (some still hold dogmatically to one perspective or the other), few are exploring consciousness from the second-per­ son perspective. Although the second-person perspective has been almost entirely overlooked in Western philosophy, the notion of intcrsubjectivity has actually had significant proponents in other disciplines­ such as linguistics, social psychology, psychotherapy, and anthropology. The author proposes that inter­ subjectivity is a foundation to both a philosophical understanding of and an experiential engagement with transpersonal phenomena. Having clarified what he means by the key terms consciousness, subjec­ tivity, and intersubjeetivity, the author gives a rationale for a second-person approach to conscious­ ness studies, then surveys significant historical precursors to the notion of intersubjectivity in Western philosophy and proposes an evolutionary model of consciousness based on a distinction between inter­ subjective and interpersonal consciousness-a model that provides a philosophical foundation for the core insights of transpersonal psychology. In the conclusion, some possible objections to intersubjectiv­ ity are addressed and implications for a second-person methodology are considered.

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