Consequentialism and Moral Responsibility

Abstract

This chapter argues that there is a responsibility constraint that applies to all normative theories: what is deemed right or wrong must be something agents could reasonably be deemed responsible for. We should understand Bernard Williams’s objections to consequentialism as being based on the responsibility constraint: Williams worries that consequentialism assigns too much responsibility. However, consequentialism can and should embrace the responsibility constraint, and that has interesting results. The chapter uses the example of coercion to show that, at least in some circumstances, consequentialism can allow a doing/allowing distinction; this contrasts with the standard way of accommodating a doing/allowing distinction, which allows agent-relativity directly into the theory. The chapter closes by addressing James Lenman’s worry that consequentialists are clueless about unforeseeable consequences, and that this undermines the theory. If we see the limits of consequentialism as being defined by the responsibility constraint, Lenman’s objection is not worrying.

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