Truthmaker realism

Abstract

We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion of projection, which holds between a judgment p and an object x when the truth of p entails the existence of x. A truthmaker for a judgment p is then a necessitator for p which satisfies the further constraint that it is part of p’s projection. We offer a formal theory of the truthmaker relation thus defined, exploiting ontological tools of basic mereology and the theory of dependence. We then apply the theory to a range of problems connected with generic expressions, ellipsis, vagueness, and indexical and perceptual judgments. 1. Two Sides to Truthmaking There are two aspects of truthmaking, corresponding to the two directions of fit between judgment and reality. On the one hand, reality constrains the practice of judgment by determining which contingent judgments are true. On the other hand, our practice of judgment affects reality itself, in the weak sense that when we make (true) contingent judgments, then we thereby – wittingly or not – delineate corresponding truthmaking chunks of what is real. Writings on truthmaking in recent years have concentrated primarily on the first of these aspects. 2 My aim in what follows will be to show that some of the problems faced by existing truthmaker theories can be solved if account is taken also of the second aspect.

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