I show that a lump-sum cost incurred for keeping track of future transactions predicts several known departures from the standard discounting model: an agent who incurs such costs will exhibit decreasing impatience with preference reversals; a magnitude eect, i.e. discounting large amounts less than small amounts; a sign eect, i.e. discounting gains more than losses; and an Andreoni-Sprenger (2012) type reduction of discounting and decreasing impatience when delayed outcomes are added onto existing delayed outcomes. In addition, agents of this type will under certain circumstances prefer to “pre-crastinate”, i.e. incur losses sooner rather than later, which is a common feature of everyday experience but is currently not captured in discounting models. Additionally, the model generates loss aversion, one of the hallmarks of prospect theory. Finally, the model predicts status quo bias and default choice. In particular, it predicts that agents will fail to adopt profitable technologies, not because they do not value them, but because they forget to undertake the steps necessary to use them. The model further predicts that this problem can be alleviated through reminders, for which agents are willing to pay. Examples in development economics include SMS reminders to save, chlorine dispensers at the water source, vaccination camps, and reminders to use fertilizer.
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