PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS AND THEORIES OF MEMORY: A NEW EPISTEMOLOGY TO SUPPLEMENT THE OLD

Abstract

This paper examines two epistemologies on the nature of theory and its role in practical applications of memory research and science in general. Although the empirical epistemology has dominated psychological research over the past seventy years; I argue that the rational epistemology is more conducive to sophisticated practical applications, and that achieving a balance betwee ~ two episti:mologies is needed for. solving many other problems in the field. The desire to address practical issues has a long history in psychology, and recent expressions of frustration by psychologists such as Tulving (1979) and Neisse ~ (1985) over the inapplicability of current experimental knowledge are understandable. What.applications there have been.are quite unlike the sophisticated theory-based applications one sees from the advanced sciences, and are often difficult to distinguish from common sense. The present paper examipes two epistemologies on how practical applications should originate in memory research and psychology in general. I will argue that the relative inapplicability of psychological knowledge is attributabie in part to the domination of psychological research by the empirical epistemology over the past seventy years, that its complement, the rational epistemology, is much more conducive to sophisticated practical applications and provides an important new perspective on the m~tatheoretical debate currently ongoing among

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