Construct Stabilization and the Unity of the Mind-Brain Sciences

Jacqueline Anne Sullivan

46 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of Science

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Philosophy and History of Science Philosophy and Theoretical Science Embodied and Extended Cognition

Abstract

This article offers a critique of an account of explanatory integration that claims that explanations of cognitive capacities by functional analyses and mechanistic explanations can be seamlessly integrated. It is shown that achieving such explanatory integration requires that the terms designating cognitive capacities in the two forms of explanation are stable but that experimental practice in the mind-brain sciences currently is not directed at achieving such stability. A positive proposal for changing experimental practice so as to promote such stability is put forward, and its implications for explanatory integration are briefly considered.

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References

1955Construct validity in psychological tests.1961The Structure of Science 1974Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)2007Explaining the Brain 2007Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings 2007Explaining the brain : mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience 2006Scientific Perspectivism 2008Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience

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