Everyday Consequences of Analytic Thinking

Gordon Pennycook · Jonathan Albert Fugelsang · Derek J. Koehler

359 citations0/0 files storedCurrent Directions in Psychological Science

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Social and Intergroup Psychology Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Abstract

We review recent evidence revealing that the mere willingness to engage analytic reasoning as a means to override intuitive gut feelings is a meaningful predictor of key psychological outcomes in diverse areas of everyday life. For example, those with a more analytic thinking style are more skeptical about religious, paranormal, and conspiratorial concepts. In addition, analytic thinking relates to having less traditional moral values, making less emotional or disgust-based moral judgments, and being less cooperative and more rationally self-interested in social dilemmas. Analytic thinkers are even less likely to offload thinking to smartphone technology and may be more creative. Taken together, these results indicate that the propensity to think analytically has major consequences for individual psychology.

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2011Thinking, Fast and Slow 1990The case for motivated reasoning.2005Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making 2007Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition 2013Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition 2011Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory 2013Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection 2011The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks

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