Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm

Eric W. Orts

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Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Legal principles and applications Legal and Constitutional Studies

Abstract

This Article reexamines economic theories of the firm from a legal perspective. These theories are said to have "dominated" and produced a "revolution" in legal scholarship in recent years, particularly in the field of enterprise organization. In this Article, I accept the insights of this scholarship, but recommend a significant expansion of its theoretical premises. In contrast to most economic accounts, I argue that legal theory is needed for an accurate description of the business firm. In particular, I contest economic theories of the firm that fail to appreciate the importance of legal relationships of agency authority, power, and hierarchy.

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2000Incomplete Financial Contracts and Non-contractual Legal Rules: The Case of Debt Capacity and Fraudulent Conveyance Law 1999Banded Contracts, Mediating Institutions, and Corporate Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of the Firm 2003The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship

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