AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX AUDITING AND COMPLIANCE

Jeffrey A. Dubin · Louis L. Wilde

245 citations0/0 files storedNational Tax Journal

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Taxation and Compliance Studies Economic and Fiscal Studies Regulation and Compliance Studies

Abstract

This paper provides empirical evidence on the relationship between compliance with the Federal Income Tax and auditing by the Internal Revenue Service. It combines a cross-section data set rented to 1969 individual returns assembled by the IRS with data taken from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. We find support for an economic approach to tax compliance that incorporates the IRS as a strategic actor. Moreover, after allowing for the simultaneous determination of audit rates and compliance levels, we find significant deterrent effects of auditing on noncompliance.

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References

1978Specification Tests in Econometrics 1968Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 1972Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis 1983Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns 1973Tax evasion: A model 1985Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework 1986The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement 1978Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey

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2002Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration**We are grateful to Wojciech Kopczuk for valuable research assistance. Helpful comments on an earlier draft were received from Jim Alm, Alan Auerbach, Len Burman, Brian Erard, Martin Feldstein, Firouz Gahvari, Roger Gordon, Jim Hines, Jonathan Kesselman, Louis Kaplow, Jim Poterba, Agnar Sandmo, Dan Shaviro, Eric Toder, Gideon Yaniv, the participants at the NYU Law School Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance and the handbook conference held at the University of California at Berkeley.2010Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Randomized Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark 2006Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation 1989Tax Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution

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