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Governing Multiple Firms
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Governing Multiple Firms (2016)Governing Multiple FirmsPassive investors, not passive owners (2016)Passive investors, not passiv…Corporate Governance and Blockchains (2016)Corporate Governance and Bloc…Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors (2016)Behind the Scenes: The Corpor…Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia (2009)Blockholder Trading, Market E…Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance (2008)Hedge Fund Activism, Corporat…Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? (2006)Are Busy Boards Effective Mon…Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover (2003)Voting with their feet: insti…Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control? (1998)Large Shareholders as Monitor…The hidden costs of stock market liquidity (1993)The hidden costs of stock mar…Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices (1990)Limited liability and incenti…Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets (1989)Reputation Acquisition in Deb…Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior (1989)Efficient Capital Markets, In…Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia (1988)Takeover Threats and Manageri…Herd Behavior and Investment (1988)Herd Behavior and InvestmentFinancial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Financial Intermediation and …Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityEssays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The General Theory of Employment (1937)Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility (1985)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)A Simple Model of Herd Behavior (1992)The Limits of Arbitrage (1995)A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets (1999)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Law and Finance (1998)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Do Institutional Investors Drive Corporate Social Responsibility? International Evidence (2015)The Importance of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors (2019)Firms and social responsibility: A review of ESG and CSR research in corporate finance (2021)Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments (1988)Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring (1993)The Association between Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts (2005)Job Market Signaling (1973)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information (1985)The economic implications of corporate financial reporting (2005)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance (1995)Financial Dependence and Growth (1996)The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms (2003)The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing (1976)Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity (1983)The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data (1994)Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes (2000)Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors (2000)Corporate Governance and Equity Prices (2003)Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices (2011)Active Ownership (2015)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns (1992)Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2007)The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance (2010)The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey (2010)Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 (2003)
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References

  • 1984Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring8,489 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1988Herd Behavior and Investment2,815 cited
  • 1989Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior2,585 cited
  • 2006Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?1,675 cited
  • 1988Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia1,670 cited
  • 1989Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets1,627 cited
  • 2008Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance1,510 cited
  • 2016Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors1,492 cited
  • 1998Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?1,453 cited
  • 2009Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia1,264 cited
  • 2016Corporate Governance and Blockchains1,069 cited
  • 1993The hidden costs of stock market liquidity1,020 cited
  • 2003Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover1,009 cited
  • 2016Passive investors, not passive owners975 cited
  • 1990Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices

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